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Abstract
In Schelling’s segregation model [9], the successive moves of agents optimizing
their own locations lead to a suboptimal segregated distribution of the population,
even though all agents have the same preference for mixed neighborhoods. One of the
main assumptions underlying this general result of segregation models is that agents
rely on comparisons between instantaneous utilities in order to make their moving
decisions. On the contrary and certainly more reasonably, we assume in this article
that agents forecast later states using a linear extrapolation of past states heuristic
in order to make their decisions. We show that for a relatively small set of parame-
ters, considering forecasting agents allows to dramatically reduce sub-optimality in a
framework close to [9]’s model.
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1 Introduction
We now know from many experiments as well as many theoretical works that agents
making decisions in a decentralized way can lead to a socially suboptimal situation. Ex-
ternalities are one important reason that can explain why micro motives can lead to bad
macro behavior [10]. Externalities are present when the actions of an individual may have
an impact on another individual’s welfare. Then, the centralized optimization problem,
taking into account this impact can hardly have the same results as the combination of
decentralized optimization problems not taking into account the externalities, by definition
of what an externality is.
One particular example of this case is the segregation model proposed by [9], using
a framework close to [7] and on which [4], [5] and [2] elaborated recently. We will use
the formulation introduced in the two latter studies for the sake of its simplicity. In
this agent-based model, all agents have the same preferences for living in a mixed city,
i.e. in neighborhoods with intermediate density. However, the dynamics of decentralized
decision making individuals generally leads to a collection of overpopulated and empty
neighborhoods. Then, even though all individuals have the same, therefore non conflicting,
social and individual goals, the social optimum is not attained by the society by means of
decentralized decision making. Economically, the reason is that when an agent changes its
location, she does not take into account the resulting situation for the individuals living in
the neighborhood she is leaving. This is where the externality lies. Even though the global
goal is well-defined and the same for all individuals, her own welfare may locally contradict
the social welfare. When making a choice, she does not simply compute her share of the
global optimization problem as she would if there was no externality. Notice that, even
though it is in a radically different dynamic setting, it is the same reasoning that explains
why the absence of externality is a necessary condition for the first fundamental theorem
of welfare economics to apply (see [6]).
Another reason for which the segregation models cited above miss the social common
target and lead to suboptimal situation is that individuals have some sort of bounded
rationality. Indeed, in all these models, agents make their decisions based on the current
situation whereas the situation that is used to measure the final welfare – the one that is
suboptimal and that should somehow be only an aggregation of the agents’ utility func-
tions – is the one obtained at stationary state, once an equilibrium is reached. For an
agent to be fully rational in this setting, she should anticipate the future possible states
and integrate these expectations in her computation for decision-making. In most studies
directly related to [9], when an agent has an opportunity to move, she compares the current
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utility she would get from moving to the current utility she would get from staying. That
is fine if we consider either that agents have infinite discount factor or if they are myopic
to the future. If both of this assumptions are not accepted, they should try to anticipate
what will come next and evaluate their intertemporal utilities from moving or staying.
To the best of our knowledge, only [1] consider fully rational agents in a particular
segregation model setting. However, their results can hardly be generalized beyond the
precise model they use with a ring city. Indeed, considering decisions of agents able to
make expectations in a model is computationally complex. Indeed, on the one hand,
expectations influence choices and hence the dynamics of the system. But in the other hand,
the dynamics should somehow influence the expectations for acceptably rational agents.
In simple continuous cases, the theory of rational expectations is used by economists ([8])
in order to technically transform this problem in the analytical search for a (functional)
fixed point. In some more complex systems with continuous dynamics, special solving
algorithms are introduced ([3] for one example). In the current study, we will rely on an
extrapolation heuristics. Agents forecasts future states over some time horizon by linearly
extrapolating from recent history. This way, forecasts are made looking backward and the
complexity to have both expectations and dynamics coupled vanishes and our complex
problem can be solved with stochastic simulations. We do not lose the full richness of the
segregation models.
As a consequence of considering expectations as an extrapolation of past states, we
will be able to show that for some small domains of parameters, the inefficiencies of the
[9] model can be dramatically reduced. This result sets a bound for the main result of
segregation models – sub-optimality of the sequence of individual decisions –in a direction
– forecasting agents – that has been overlooked until now.
In Section 2, we present the model extensively borrowed from [5] with the formal
description of how we expect agents to form their expectations. In Section 3, we display
our results and concentrate on a case where segregation is almost completely non present
at stationary state. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Materials and methods
Dynamics. Our formal framework is extensively borrowed from [5]. We consider a set
of agents moving from one neighborhood to another in a city. The city is divided in Q
neighborhoods (Q = 36 throughout the present article). Each neighborhood can accom-
modate H agents (H = 225 throughout the present article) in housing sites. The number
of agents is N (N = H × Q × 0.4 = 3, 240 throughout the present article). The initial
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state is stochastic and generated by randomly drawing with uniform probability an initial
neighborhood for each agent (satisfying the constraint that the number of agents in each
neighborhood be smaller than H).1 As time continuously passes by, each agent is drawn
by chance following a Poisson Process with rate λ. λ is normalized to be 1. Once an agent
is considered, she is matched with an empty housing site uniformly picked at random. The
agent can then decide to move to the designated house using the decision rule extensively
described below.
In any given neighborhood, an agent has an instantaneous utility u(ρ) that depends on
density ρ.2 She gets a maximum utility for ρ = 1/2 and then loses utility with constant
marginal effect as density gets further away from 1/2. Formally, after normalization so
that u(0) = u(1) = 0 and u(1/2) = 1:
∀ρ ∈ [0, 1], u(ρ) =
{
2.ρ if ρ < 0.5,
2.(1− ρ) otherwise.
Moving decisions. Let us consider an agent from neighborhood i who has a chance
to move to neighborhood j at time T . First, the agent forecasts the future population
densities in each neighborhood by applying a linear extrapolation using the following two
points: the current population density and the one at time T −m.3 We will call parameter
m the memory length. Formally, if ρTi and ρ
T−m
i are the population densities observed in
neighborhood i at times T and T −m respectively, the population density at time t > T
forecast by an agent is given by4
ρ∗i (t) =
[
ρTi +
ρTi − ρT−mi
m
.(t− T )
]1
0
.
Now, at time t, the agent expects total future utility U∗i (t) to be the discounted sum of
the instantaneous utility applied to her population density forecast over a given horizon m
that we will call the forecast length. Formally,
U∗i (t) =
∫ t+m
t
e−β.(θ−t)u(ρ∗i (θ))dθ
1In Appendix, we display results for different initial conditions. Results remain qualitatively valid even
though base value are different.
2The density of a neighborhood is the number of individuals living in this neighborhood divided by the
number of accommodation sites in this neighborhood, H.
3Notice that when considering the current population in j, the agent considers her move in this neigh-
borhood.
4For any real number r, [r]10 = max(0,min(r, 1)) is the identity function with bounds in 0 and 1. Also,
if T −m < 0, we consider the past population in 0.
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where β is the discount factor. Throughout this article, we will consider β = 0.03.5 Finally,
the agent accepts to move from neighborhood i to neighborhood j at time t if and only if
U∗j (t) > U
∗
i (t).
Notice that the heuristics we consider can be labeled extrapolating in the sense that
expectations are computed using past observations only. Notice that the agents we consider
are not fully rational in the sense usually used in economics. In particular, they are not
rational in the sense of rational expectations that forecast the states that will actually
occur in the future, see [6, 8].
3 Results
Let us first consider the extreme case with the forecast length m arbitrarily small and
the memory length m not too small. In this case, comparisons between neighborhoods are
made as if depending on the instantaneous utility obtained in each neighborhood and we
find the same results, displayed in Figure 1, as in [5]. At the start, we have population
densities close to 40 % in all neighborhoods and hence an average instantaneous utility
close to 0.8. However, even though all individuals have the same objective to live in a
neighborhood with population density 50 %, the population stabilizes with empty neigh-
borhoods and neighborhoods with densities between 75 % and 80 %. Hence, a stationary
state is reached with average instantaneous utility of about 0.5.
Figure 1: Model dynamics with m = 10−2 and m = 10−4. Left: Average instantaneous
utility with 95 % confidence interval computed over 120 repetitions. Right: Neighborhoods
population densities for one repetition.
Now, let us consider the extreme case with the memory length m arbitrarily small
and the forecast length m not too small. In this extreme case, any observed change in
population density for a neighborhood leads to a short-term forecast of 0 or 1 for future
5In a standard general equilibrium model, β should be close to the economy interest rate.
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population density in this neighborhood and hence a small intertemporal utility. Hence,
no move – implying a change in the destination neighborhood population density – is
ever implemented, the population densities are constant at about 40 % and the average
instantaneous utility is close to 0.8.
In Figure 2, we display the average instantaneous utility at its stationary value as a
function of the memory length m and the forecast length m.
Figure 2: Average instantaneous utility at stationary value as a function of the memory
length m and the forecast length m. Values averaged over 120 repetitions.
We can see that the transition from the extreme cases noted above is not monotonic and
there are cases with average instantaneous utility larger than the 0.8 mark. Hence, memory
and expectations can solve the problem of externalities that makes a society of individuals
with the same personal objective (living in a 50 % density neighborhood) socially miss
this objective. In the following, we consider the case with memory length m = 10−2 and
forecast length m = 1. In this case, at stationary state, the average instantaneous utility
reaches 0.92 (95 % CI: 0.91 – 0.93). In Figure 3, we display the average instantaneous
utility and neighborhoods population densities in this case.
When m = 10−2 and m = 1, the population spreads very quickly between a number
of neighborhoods with population density close to 50 %, hence reaching a situation with
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Figure 3: Model dynamics with m = 10−2 and m = 1. Left: Average instantaneous
utility with 95 % confidence interval computed over 120 repetitions. Right: Neighborhoods
population densities for one repetition.
average instantaneous utility close to 1. Only relatively small variations around density
50 % prevents the situation to be optimal.
In order to go further in our reasoning, let us describe Figure 4. Given m and m,
the intertemporal expected utility an agent computes at any time t depends only on the
population density in the past (at t−m) and at time t. In Figure 4, we display the expected
(with m = 1) intertemporal utility as a function of both the present population density in
a neighborhood and the density in the same neighborhood m before, i.e. in the memory.
Figure 4: Left: Expected intertemporal (computed over m = 1) utility from living in a
neighborhood as a function of the present population density in this neighborhood and the
change in population density in this same neighborhood over the past m = 10−2. Dashed
lines for identical values contours. Right: Same zoomed around 0 ordinate.
Now, let us explain Figure 4 that is not obvious to interpret. Let us consider a given
neighborhood with 50 % current population density and 50 % past population density.
Since no variation in the past is observed on average, agents expect that the density will
remain unchanged in the m long future. Hence, the expected intertemporal utility is
maximal with a constant 1 instantaneous utility. Now, if the observed past population is
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greater than 50 % (negative change), a future decrease in population density is expected
and hence a decreased expected intertemporal utility. The same occurs for an observed
past population smaller than 50 %. Now, let us consider a current population density of
40 %. A past negative change of population density implies an expected population density
decreasing even further in the future and hence a fast decreasing expected intertemporal
utility. On the contrary, a small past positive change of population density implies an
expected future population density that will get close to 50 % and hence a high expected
intertemporal utility. Of course, if this positive change is too large, it is also expected that
the population density will increase until it reaches values that bring very low instantaneous
utility.
Now, let us try and give some hints to explain the dynamics displayed in Figure 3 with
the following steps.
1. In the beginning, individuals consider the possibility to move from a neighborhood
with a population density constant and close to 40 % to a neighborhood with a
population density close to 40 % and increasing due to the extrapolation of their own
move. Given the parameters, they do accept to move.
2. However, as population tends to concentrate in a few neighborhoods, the ones growing
fastest and with density closest to 50 % are the less attractive ones since it is expected
that they will bring lower future streams of utility.
3. As population settles and memory integrates the fact that there was no recent move,
decisions not to move are unchanged.
In the extreme case with m arbitrarily small and the forecast length m not too small,
incentives described in Step 1 are not enough for a move to be considered anything but
going in a neighborhood that will be overcrowded pretty soon. Hence, no move ever takes
place. In the extreme case with the forecast length m arbitrarily small and the memory
length m not too small, moving into neighborhoods with high population densities is made
more interesting than as described in Step 2 by removing the forecast part of the reasoning.
Hence, the overcrowded neighborhoods in the stationary states in this case.
Finally, when Step 3 does not hold, we can observe oscillatory dynamics. In Figure 5,
we show such a dynamics obtained with m = 102.25 ≈ 177.8 and m = 1.6
6An alternative dynamics where Step 3 is not satisfied transitory is displayed in Figure App-4 in
Appendix.
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Figure 5: Model dynamics with m = 1 and m = 102.25. Left: Average instantaneous utility
with 95 % confidence interval computed over 120 repetitions (one particular repetition in
grey). Right: Neighborhoods population densities for one repetition (in black one particular
neighborhood).
4 Conclusion
In this article, we introduced, in a framework very close to [5], forecasting agents. These
agents make their moving decisions using expectations for the future applying a linear
extrapolation of the past. This formalization allows us to simulate a segregation model
stochastically and yet have agents forming forecasts. We showed that for a relatively narrow
set of parameters, this taking into account of expectations could solve the sub-optimality
of decentralized decision making in segregation models.
In order to conclude, we would like to make a couple of remarks regarding the extrapo-
lation heuristic we used in this article. First, we do not claim any uniqueness relatively to
any desirable feature it may have. The only justification we have is its intuitive superiority
over the fully myopic agents assumption implicitly set in all segregation models. Second,
we are aware that some features of this heuristic are not desirable. In particular and im-
portantly, notice that because the population densities and their forecasts are bounded
between 0 and 1 for each neighborhood, there is no reason that individuals forecast den-
sities that always have the same constant sum, N
Q.H
with our notation. Yet, forecasts
with linear extrapolations seem one reasonable assumption to us even though many other
heuristics could be set. The interest of our study rather lies in the originality of the study
of forward-looking agents – contrary to fully myopic until now – in segregation model. We
sincerely hope that it will lead to more systematic studies in this direction.
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Appendix
A Additional results
In Figure App-1 and App-2, we display the expected intertemporal utilities depending
on both the present population density in a given neighborhood and the change in popu-
lation density in this same neighborhood. m and m are chosen so that they match values
in Figures 1 and 5 of the manuscript respectfully.
Figure App-1: Left: Expected intertemporal (computed over m = 10−4) utility from living
in a neighborhood as a function of the present population density in this neighborhood
and the change in population density in this same neighborhood over the past m = 10−2.
Dashed lines for identical values contours. Right: Same zoomed around 0 ordinate.
Figure App-2: Left: Expected intertemporal (computed overm = 102.25) utility from living
in a neighborhood as a function of the present population density in this neighborhood and
the change in population density in this same neighborhood over the past m = 1. Dashed
lines for identical values contours. Right: Same zoomed around 0 ordinate.
In Figure App-3, we display the average instantaneous utility at its stationary value as a
function of the memory length m and the forecast length m with initial conditions different
from the ones described in the manuscript. Here, we consider agents and allocate them
1
randomly in neighborhoods with probability i∑
j=1,...,Q j
for each neighborhood i ∈ {1, ..., Q}
(1-indexed).
Figure App-3: Average instantaneous utility at stationary value as a function of the memory
length m and the forecast length m. Values averaged over 120 repetitions. Alternative
initial conditions.
2
Figure App-4: Model dynamics with m = 100.25 and m = 104. Left: Average instanta-
neous utility with 95 % confidence interval computed over 120 repetitions (one particular
repetition in grey). Right: Neighborhoods population densities for one repetition.
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